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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
COLORADO STEVEN IRWIN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150217-CA 
Appellant is not incarcerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Iiwin's opening brief argued that the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding a restitution amount in excess of the replacement value of the watches. It 
argued that the improper restitution amount constituted a windfall for the victim and 
punitive damages against Mr. Iiwin. It further argued that the restitution value was 
improperly based on lost opportunity costs, which were speculative and too attenuated 
from the criminal conduct. In response, the State contends that the trial court properly 
ordered the restitution amount as derived from the manufacturer's suggested retail price 
("MSRP") of the watches. For the reasons set forth in the opening brief and in this reply 
brief, the State is incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief."). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Under Utah's Crime Victim's Restitution Act, a Victim is Entitled to 
Pecuniary Damages, Making the Victim Whole by Compensating the 
Victim for Actual, Demonstrable Losses. 
The State is mistaken in its contention that the trial court properly ordered 
restitution in excess of the replacement value of the watches. In addition to the argument 
set forth in Appellant's opening brief, the State is mistaken for the following reasons: (1) 
retail value is not a proper restitution amount when it fails to reflect the actual, 
demonstrable losses sustained by the victim, when it constitutes a windfall for the victim, 
and when it constitutes pecuniary damages for the defendant; (2) applying the 
replacement value of an item for a restitution award does not encourage further thefts; 
and (3) the MSRP value did not constitute proper generalized restitution damages, but 
improper speculative and attenuated amounts. 
A. Retail value is not a proper restitution amount when it fails to reflect the actual, 
demonstrable losses sustained by the victim, when it constitutes a windfall for 
the victim, and when it constitutes pecuniary damages for the defendant. 
Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act ("the Act") allows crime victims to be made 
whole by restoring them to the economic position that they were in before the crime 
occurred. Utah Code §77-38a-301; see also Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 
UT 59, ,I26, 96 P.3d 893. Furthermore, the Act only allows restitution awards for 
pecuniary damages, which is "demonstrable economic injur[y ]" that could be recovered 
in a civil action with similar facts. State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ,Il0, 221 P.3d 273 
(emphasis added); Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). Case law in both Utah and nationwide 
makes clear that in making a victim whole, appropriate restitution awards should meet 
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certain objectives. A proper restitution amount must: (1) address actual, not speculative 
losses suffered by the victim; (2) not constitute a windfall for the victim; and (3) not 
constitute pecuniary damages against a defendant. See Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 
869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, Jenkins v. Hesston, 879 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1994); State v. Hall, 304 P.3d 677, 681 (Kan. 2013); State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT 
App 146, if 6, 788 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; see also Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). In meeting 
these objectives, the retail value of an item may or may not be the appropriate value to 
apply, depending upon the unique facts of each case. That is, using the retail value of an 
item in determining restitution is only appropriate to the extent that it meets these 
objectives. See State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,I13, 788 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; see also 
State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, if15, 82 P.3d 211; Hall, 304 P.3d 677,681 (Kan. 
2013). 
The State argues that the retail value of an item is the general standard that should 
presumptively apply when determining the appropriate amount of restitution, and that 
once the State puts on evidence of an item's retail value, it then becomes the defendant's 
burden to prove why retail value should not be imposed. See Appellee's Br. 6, 16-17. 
Furthermore, the State argues that its burden was satisfied in this matter, and not 
adequately rebutted by Mr. Irwin. See Appellee's Br. 16-17. The State, however, is 
mistaken because: 1) it imposed the wrong standard for deciding appropriate restitution 
amounts; and 2) it misunderstood its burden and improperly shifted it to Mr. Irwin. 
First, neither the Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act nor Utah case law create a 
rebuttable presumption that the retail value of an item is the appropriate value to use 
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when determining restitution. Utah Code §77-38a-301; Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). 
While the Act lists "fair market value" as a measure to be used to decide "pecuniary 
damages[,]" it does not provide a way to determine the fair market value of items. Thus, 
the Act does not specifically denote that the retail value ( or wholesale value) of an item is 
the standard for "fair market value" that should presumptively apply when determining 
an appropriate restitution award. Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). It is worth noting that 
Utah's Restitution Act does not give any specific definition for "fair market value." Id. 
This term, as it applies to restitution cases, has been defined under case law as "what the 
owner of the property could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer would 
pay." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, at ,I6 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This is variable in practice because it depends upon who is buying, and who is 
selling. Hall, 304 P.3d 677, 681. For instance, a consumer will usually pay a higher price 
for an item than will a business entity (who can obtain the item for a whole sale price). 
See Guess v. Montague, 51 F.Supp. 61, 65 (E.D. S.C. 1942) ("[i]n commercial circles the 
terms retail and wholesale convey distinct and entirely different meanings. A retail price 
is the price that the ultimate consumer is expected to pay, and a wholesale price is that 
price which the retailer pays in the expectation of obtaining a higher price by way of 
profit from the ultimate consumer."). 1 
1 While Utah's Restitution Act does not statutorily define "fair market value," this term is 
statutorily defined in different, unrelated sections of the Utah Code. Even in these 
sections, "fair market value" is not equated to being the retail value of an item. See Utah 
Code §59-2-102 (12) ("'Fair market value' means the amount at which property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. 
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In addition, Utah case law does not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
retail value as the appropriate restitution value. Rather, Utah case law points out that the 
true measure of damage is flexible, allowing trial courts to fashion an equitable award to 
the victim that addresses the actual losses suffered by the victim. See Jenkins v. 
Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, at 1004 (stating "rules relating to the measure of 
damages are flexible, and can be modified in the interest of fairness" ( emphasis added) 
(quotations omitted). See also Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r15 ("[t]he appropriate 
measure of the loss or damage to a victim is fact-sensitive and will vary based on the facts 
of a particular case.") ( emphasis added). In fact, this Court has suggested that it is against 
any sort of presumptive rule that would favor the retail price, purchase price, or 
wholesale price, etc. of an item as being determinative of the actual pecuniary losses 
suffered by a victim. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r 15, 82 P.3d 211,215 ("We 
think it unwise to adopt a black-letter rule that either always requires or never permits the 
use of purchase price or insurance settlement amount as valuation methods under the 
restitution statute."). Thus, Utah's Restitution Act and case law do not list the retail value 
For purposes of taxation, 'fair market value' shall be determined using the current zoning 
laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable 
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in 
question and the change would have an appreciable influence upon the value."); see also 
Utah Code §31A-23a-402.5 (9) ("For purposes of this section, 'fair market value' means 
what a knowledgeable, willing, and unpressured buyer would pay for a product or service 
to a knowledgeable, willing, and unpressured seller in the open market without any 
connection to other goods, services, including insurance services, or contracts, including 
insurance contracts, sold by the producer, consultant, or other licensee, or an officer or 
employee of the licensee."). 
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of an item as being the presumptively correct restitution amount, and appropriately so, 
because this amount may not reflect the actual economic losses suffered by the victim. 
See Jenkins, 869 P.2d 1000, 1004; see also Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, at iJ9.2 
Second, the State misunderstood and improperly shifted its burden in this matter. 
The State argued that it met its burden because it "presented prima facia evidence of the 
retail value of the stolen watches." See Appellee's Br. 19. The State also argued that Mr. 
Irwin failed to properly rebut this evidence. See Appellee's Br. 16-17, 19 The State is 
mistaken about its burden. In determining a proper restitution amount, it is not the State's 
burden to simply put on evidence of an item's retail value. Rather, it is the State's burden 
to put on proof of the victim's actual losses. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, at ,I13 
("[T]he State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the appropriate amount of 
restitution"); See also State v. Hight, 2008 UT App 118, iJ 3, 182 P.3d 922, 923 ("In 
determining the appropriate amount of restitution, trial courts are required to consider, 
inter alia, the cost of loss to the victim.") ( emphasis added); Moore v. State, 643 So.2d 
2(1994) (In a restitution issue, "[t]he state attorney has the burden of showing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the amount of loss a victim has sustained as a result of a 
2 The State's brief addresses a number of cases in Utah and outside jurisdictions 
that determined retail value as the appropriate restitution value to apply. See Appellee's 
Br. 10-11. None of these cases, however, adequately support the State's proposition that 
Utah Courts have applied a rebuttable presumption in favor of retail value when 
determining restitution amounts. Rather, the cases relied upon by both the State and Mr. 
Irwin ultimately indicate that the test for determining the restitution awards is one that is 
"flexible," and one that should effectively compensate a victim for their actual losses, 
thus placing the victim in the position he would have been in had the crime not been 
committed. See Jenkins, 869 P.2d 1000, 1004. See also Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, iJiJ6, 
8. 
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crime and that the defendant caused the victim's loss.") (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations omitted); People v. Jessee, 222 Cal.App.4th 501(2013) ("The burden is on the 
party seeking restitution to provide an adequate factual basis for the claim ... Once the 
prosecution has made a prima facie showing of the victim's loss, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to demonstrate that the amount of loss is other than that claimed by the 
victim.") ( emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); State v. Kayon, 256 Wis.2d 577 
(2002) (In a restitution hearing, "the burden of demonstrating loss by the preponderance 
of the evidence shifts to the victim, unless the court orders the district attorney to 
represent the victim.") ( emphasis added and also in original). 
Thus, if the State puts on evidence of an item's retail value, the State must then 
prove that the retail value does in fact reflect the victim's actual losses. See Ludlow, 2015 
UT App 146, at ,I9. If the State cannot do so, then the retail value of the item is not the 
appropriate value to use for the restitution amount. Here, the State did not meet its burden 
in showing that the retail value of the watches reflected the actual losses suffered by the 
victim. 
Here, the replacement value of the watches ($13,651.40) represented the actual 
losses sustained by the victim. R.30-34; 85:11-13. See State v. Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 
138, if 13, 351 P.3d 826; see also Jenkins 869 P.2d at 1004. Prior to the burglary and theft, 
the victim business had 102 Rockwell watches. R.2. Making the victim whole for actual 
losses, therefore, required granting a restitution award that would allow the victim 
business to once again own 102 Rockwell watches. See Wadsworth, 2015 UT App 138, at 
if 13. The replacement value would have allowed the victim to once again own 102 
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Rockwell watches and restore the victim to the economic position that the business was 
in prior to the commission of the crimes. See Mahana, 2004 UT 59, at ,126. Furthermore, 
the State failed to present any evidence that the victim business could not reacquire 102 
similar watches if given the replacement value of the watches. Because the victim was a 
business, and not a consumer, it is reasonable to assume that the victim could obtain the 
watches again for their replacement costs rather than the retail value of the watches. R. 
84:14; see also Guess v. Montague, 51 F.Supp. 61, 65. The State failed to prove 
otherwise. Thus, it was not Mr. Irwin's burden to show why the retail value of the 
watches was inappropriate, but it was the State's burden to show why the retail value 
constituted the actual losses sustained by the victim. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, at 
,I,111- 13. The State did not do so and instead improperly shifted its burden to Mr. Irwin. 
B. Applying the replacement value of an item for a restitution award does not 
encourage further thefts 
The State argues that the replacement value of the watches should not be awarded 
because it would incentivize additional thefts. See Appellee's Br. at 12-13. The State 
argues that "using replacement cost would effectively give thieves a wholesaler's 
discount, encouraging further thefts in lieu of legitimate retail purchases." Id. at 12. The 
State is mistaken. First, the proper means of deterring future criminal behavior is 
accomplished when judges employ traditional sentencing conditions such as 
incarceration, fines, and community service, etc. See State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ,164, 
353 P.3d 55. A trial judge is not prevented from imposing these types of sentencing 
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conditions to deter future criminal behavior when awarding the replacement value of an 
item as the appropriate restitution amount. 
Second, while restitution does function as providing a deterrence, it does not 
justify the imposition of a discretionary financial obligation that exceeds the actual 
financial losses to the victim. See State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,I18, 214 P.3d 104. The 
State's reasoning would allow trial judges to impose arbitrary and excessive restitution 
amounts just for the sake deterring future criminal behavior. Thus, for good reason, 
Utah's Restitution Act and case law is clear that an appropriate restitution amount 
constitutes the actual, demonstrable financial losses sustained by the victim, and nothing 
more. Utah Code §77-38a-301; see also Jenkins, 869 P.2d 1000, 1004. As argued supra 
and in Mr. Irwin's opening brief, the replacement value of the watches is the appropriate 
restitution award because this amount reflects the actual losses to the victim. 3 
C. The MSRP value did not constitute proper generalized restitution damages, but 
improper speculative and attenuated amounts 
Mr. Irwin's opening brief argued that the MSRP value was an improper restitution 
amount because it constituted a financial windfall for the victim and an unfair punitive 
3 If this Court is persuaded by the State's argument that restitution awards should take 
into account whether they incentivize future problematic behavior, as opposed to 
focusing only on the actual losses sustained by a victim, then there is a similar type of 
argument to be made against always applying the MSRP value as the standard restitution 
award. That is, during times when market conditions are bad and consumer demand for 
items is low, a business would be incentivized to have extremely lax security measures in 
the hopes that their items would be stolen, especially if they knew that the MSRP value 
of an item would always be awarded by a trial judge. A struggling business would receive 
more money for their items from restitution awards than through actual retail sales. This 
hypothetical is meant to illustrate why restitution awards should not be based on the 
extent to which they incentivize problematic behavior from thieves or shopkeepers, but 
should only take into account the actual, demonstrable losses of a victim. 
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damage against Mr. Irwin. In response, the State argues that the MSRP value was 
appropriate because it reflected the general damages, in the form of loss opportunity 
costs, which were sustained by the victim business. Appellee's Br. 19-23. The State is 
mistaken because the MSRP value does not constitute proper general damages, but 
denotes an aspirational, speculative, and attenuated value as related to the actual 
sustained losses in this matter. 4 
General damages must necessarily be derived from the crime committed. See 
Cohn v. J. C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306,307 (Utah 1975) ("General damages are those 
which naturally and necessarily result from the harm done. They are damages which 
everybody knows are likely to result from the harm described and so are said to be 
implied in law.") ( emphasis added). General damages, thus, do not constitute speculative 
and attenuated harms. In fact, Utah's Restitution Act is clear that that restitution is only 
awarded for demonstrable damages. Utah Code §§77-38a-301, 77-38a-102; see also 
Brown, 2009 UT App 285, at ,Il 0. In addition, Utah case law shows that when 
determining proper restitution amounts, "Utah has adopted a modified but for test to 
determine whether pecuniary damages actually arise out of criminal activities." State v. 
Birkeland, 2011 UT App 227, ,r11, 258 P.3d 662 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Here, the MSRP value did not represent proper general damages, nor did 
4 The State argued that "Irwin did not present any evidence below challenging the 
accuracy of the MSRP as a measurement of retail price." See Appellee's Br. 16-17. To be 
clear, Mr. Irwin's argument against the MSRP value is that it does not reflect the actual 
losses of the business victim, and that it was the State's burden to show otherwise. This 
argument was preserved below. See R.85:4-5, 11-13. 
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it represent actual, demonstrable losses for the victim business that arose from Mr. 
Irwin's criminal conduct. 
By definition, the MSRP value is an aspirational goal of what an item could sell 
for in a thriving economy with heightened consumer demand. 5 Here, the State failed to 
put on any evidence that the victim business would or could have received the MSRP of 
the watches had they not been stolen. See People v. Chappelone, 107 Cal.Rprt.3d 895, 
905, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). The State also failed to put on evidence that the victim 
business did not have comparable merchandise to sell its customers, or that the business 
was deprived of any watch sales whatsoever. Id. While the State points out on appeal that 
a letter attached to the victim impact statement identified the victim's business as a 
"watch company" that kept its watches in "locked display cases," this information falls 
extremely short of proving that the business victim suffered demonstrable lost 
opportunity costs that merited the restitution award of the MSRP value. See Appellee's 
Br. 23. 
Rather than proving that the MRSP value reflected the actual, demonstrable losses 
sustained by the victim business, the State on appeal impermissibly shifts the burden to 
Mr. Irwin by arguing that Mr. Irwin failed to prove that the MSRP was not the 
5 See INVESTIPEDIA, Manufacture's Suggestive Retail Price-MSRP, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/manufacturers-suggested-retail-price-msrp.asp 
(last visited December 9, 2015) (stating that MSRP value is "[t]he amount of money for 
which the company that produces a product recommends that it be sold in stores. MSRP 
does not necessarily correspond to the price retailers actually use or to the price 
customers are willing to pay. Retailers may need to set their prices below MSRP to move 
inventory, especially for items with low demand or in a sluggish economy.")(emphasis 
added). 
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appropriate amount. See Appellee's Br. at 19 ("While Iiwin could have rebutted the 
MSRP evidence by presenting evidence of the watch market in Salt Lake County, the 
condition of the watches, or the retailer's sales history or that of nearby watch shops, he 
chose not to."). The State also maintains that it met its burden. See Appellee's Br. 30 
{'The State has satisfied its burden to establish that the injury arose out of Iiwin's 
criminal conduct by proving that the retailer owned the watches, that Iiwin stole them, 
and that the watches were valued as being salable on the open market for $39,004. 
Nothing more is needed here to prove that Iiwin's theft deprived the retailer of that 
value."). 
The State is mistaken because much more was needed here to prove that the 
MSRP value was the appropriate restitution amount. That is, the State fails to see that 
merely providing proof of the MSRP value of the watches is not the same thing as 
providing proof that the victim business would have received the MSRP value for the 
watches had the crime not occurred. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, at ,r9; see also 
Chappelone, 107 Cal.Rprt.3d 895, 905, 910. Thus, the State does not see that it was the 
State's burden, and not Mr. Iiwin's, to prove that the MSRP value reflected the actual, 
demonstrable losses sustained by the victim. See Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, at ,r,r9, 11-
13. Because the State did not meet this burden, the MSRP value was merely a speculative 
amount of what the watches were worth and not indicative of the actual, demonstrative 
losses sustained by the victim business. In this matter, the actual, demonstrable losses 
sustained by the victim was being deprived of 102 watches. The replacement costs 
adequately compensated the victim's losses because it allowed the victim to again 
12 
purchase 102 watches, thereby putting the victim in the same financial position the victim 
was in prior to the burglary. See Mahana, 2004 UT 59, at 126. Thus, the trial court erred 
in ordering a restitution award that exceeded the replacement costs of the watches. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above and in the opening brief, Mr. Irwin asks the Court to 
reverse the entry of the trial court's restitution order and find that the replacement value 
of the watches of $13,651.40 is the appropriate restitution amount for this matter. 
SUBMITTED this i? 1-L day of December, 2015. 
TERESA L. WELCH 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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